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USE PREFERENCES FOR WATER
ROBERT E. BECK*
I. INTRODUCTION
We are all familiar with preferences I for water use based on location
under riparian rights doctrine 2 or priority based on time under prior
appropriation doctrine. 3 This article considers preferences for water
based on uses that water would be put to, rather than preference or
priority based on location or time. 4 The article focuses on the extent to
which use preferences exist today, the perceived purposes served by
those preferences, and what, if any, such preferences should exist in the
future.
Water law developed in the United States first in the context of
allocating surface waters 5 under the riparian rights and prior appropria-
tion doctrines.6 Both doctrines recognized, and still do, that some uses
are not permissible at all, or, if allowed, are to be severely limited. Thus,
under riparian rights doctrine a use has to be reasonable to qualify as
permissible, 7 and under prior appropriation doctrine the use has to be
beneficial/reasonable. 8 These absolute preferences that any use in order
to be protected must be either reasonable or beneficial/reasonable will
only be discussed briefly 9 since the principal focus of this article will be
* Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law.
1. "'Preference' is a generic term, and a preferential right may have one of a number of
different effects." Frank J. Trelease, Preferences to the Use of Water, 27 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 133,
133 (1955).
2. See generally I WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS chs. 6-9 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 & Supp. 2000).
3. See generally 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS chs. 11-17 (Robert E. Beck ed., 2000).
4. For earlier articles dealing with use preferences, see Jarret C. Oeltjen & Lloyd K. Fischer,
Allocation of Rights to Water: Preferences, Priorities, and The Role of the Market, 57 NEB. L. REV.
245 (1978); Alan D. Gross, Condemnation of Water Rights For Preferred Uses-A Replacement For
Prior Appropriation?, 3 WILLAMETTE L.J. 263 (1965); Trelease, supra note 1; and Robert L. Thomas,
Appropriations of Water for a Preferred Purpose, 22 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 422 (1950).
5. Legal regimes developed first for surface waters, but groundwater, which in many states is
governed by a regime different from that governing surface waters, is covered by this article, and if
something special about groundwater needs to be noted it will be noted.
6. Other doctrines developed to deal with the disposal of unwanted surface waters. There are
now three approaches to such disposal: common enemy, natural flow, and reasonable use. See
generally, 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 10.03(b); 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS
§§ 59.01-59.04 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1998 & Supp. 2000).
7. However some states in the eastern United States flirted with a "natural flow" doctrine. See I
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, § 7.02(c).
8. See generally 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 12.02(c)(2); Janet C. Neuman,
Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28
ENVTL. L. 919 (1998).
9. See discussion infra Part 11.
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on preferences among uses that fall within the reasonable or beneficial/
reasonable classifications.
While both riparian rights and prior appropriation doctrines have a
common law history,10 today statutes in both riparian rights doctrine
states and prior appropriation states contain preferences among water
uses.l" While prior appropriation common law did not develop any use
preferences,1 2 common law riparian doctrine didl3 and because most
prior appropriation statesl 4 at one time followed riparian doctrine, 15
they obviously became familiar with the common law riparian rights
preferences.
Furthermore, from early on the federal government became in-
volved with navigable watersl 6 and became the owner of vast tracts of
land containing many water sources. 17 Due to the Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution,18 federal preferences for water use, if implemented
within the exercise of Congress's enumerated powers,19 are the supreme
law of the land. Thus both state and federally created use preferences
will be considered.
After briefly discussing the absolute requirements of reasonable or
beneficial/reasonable use, this article explores (1) use preferences and
their nature created under (a) common law riparian and groundwater
doctrine, (b) federal law, (c) public trust doctrine and state sovereignty,
and (d) state statutes; (2) the functions these existing use preferences
serve; and (3) concludes with a look at what the future may or ought to
hold for use preferences.
10. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 11.02; 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra
note 2, § 7.01.
11. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 12.02(c)(2); I WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS,
supra note 2, § 9.03(a)(3).
12. Courts applying prior appropriation doctrine, however, did find some uses not to be bene-
ficial. See, e.g., Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972 (Cal. 1935)
(flooding to exterminate rodents); Blaine County Inv. Co. v. Mays, 291 P. 1055 (Idaho 1930) (flooding
to form ice for preserving soil moisture).
13. See 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, § 7.02(b).
14. There are 18 prior appropriation states. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3,
§ 11.04(a). The exceptions to following riparian doctrine are the six Colorado doctrine states. See 2
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 12.01. But even among those six, Nevada followed
riparian doctrine for a short time. See Jones v. Adams, 6 P. 442, 448 (Nev. 1885).
15. See I WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, §§ 8.01-8.04.
16. See generally 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS ' 35.02 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1998 & Supp.
2000).
17. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 11.03(a).
18. See U.S. CONST. art.Vl, cl. 2; see also 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 16, § 35.08.
19. See generally 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 16, §§ 37.01-37.06.
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II. THE REASONABLE AND BENEFICIAL/REASONABLE USE
REQUIREMENTS
Although the primary focus of this article is on preferences among
uses of water that generally are recognized as permissible uses because
they are reasonable or beneficial/reasonable, it is necessary to consider
these limitations themselves because, particularly as to the western United
States, some uses that currently enjoy a preferred status had a struggle to
even be recognized as beneficial uses in the first instance. Status may
change again.
Reasonable use under riparian doctrine is a balancing act. Basically
each riparian has an equal right to make a reasonable use of the water, 20
but in doing so the user has "an obligation not to injure unreasonably
another riparian user." 21 Courts, as a general proposition, have not
determined that a particular use of the water by a riparian would be
unreasonable in the abstract and without more. 22 Rather, a use becomes
unreasonable when it interferes unreasonably with another riparian's
use of the water. 23 In this context it is not profitable to talk about cer-
tain uses being reasonable or unreasonable. Any use is prima facie
reasonable but might be unreasonable in a particular context.
It was clear by the time North Dakota enacted its Irrigation Code in
1905 that under prior appropriation doctrine: "Beneficial use shall be
the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right to use of water . . ."24
Under prior appropriation doctrine water was usually diverted from its
source 25 so that two questions developed in assessing beneficial use
under that doctrine: Was the diverted water used at all?; 26 Was the water
that was being used, being used beneficially? 27 No right was acquired
until water was put to use and then only if the use was considered to be a
beneficial use. In addition, theoretically, once water had been put to
beneficial use and a water right obtained, the right could be lost, in whole
or in part, for subsequent wasteful, that is, nonbeneficial, use of the water.
Under prior appropriation doctrine some uses were determined in
the abstract to be nonbeneficial. 28 And legislatures from time to time
declared some uses of water to be nonbeneficial. For example, in the
20. See I WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, § 7.02(d).
21. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, § 7.02.
22. See 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, § 7.02(d)(1).
23. See 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, § 7.02(d)(2).
24. 1905 N.D. Laws ch. 34, § 2.
25. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 12.02(c)(I).
26. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 12.02(c)(2), at 24-25.
27. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 12.02(c)(2), at 24-25.
28. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 12.02(c)(2), at 26.
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1970s when the prospects for developing coal slurry pipelines were
good, 29 several states became concerned with the quantity of water that
would be required to mix with the coal to create the slurry, which in turn
would be transported out of the state, and enacted prohibitory statutes. 30
Oklahoma provided simply: "No Oklahoma water from any source
shall be used in connection with the transportation, maintenance or
operation of a coal slurry pipeline within or through the State of
Oklahoma." 31
Frank Trelease recounts how the "reasonableness" aspect came
into play as a part of prior appropriation doctrine.3 2 While the focus on
reasonableness occurs more in the context of conveyance and applica-
tion methods rather than the end use to which the water is put, 33 it can
have ramifications as to end use as well.
The evolutionary aspect of beneficial/reasonable use under prior
appropriation doctrine is captured in the following excerpt from an
opinion by Judge Bakes of the Idaho Supreme Court:
What we have decided in this case is that the use now before us,
although not specifically listed in . . . the [Idaho] Constitution,
is beneficial because, considering today's circumstances, the
legislative classification is reasonable based on the record. I
would restrict today's holding to the narrow proposition that
the use before us is beneficial so long as, and only so long as,
the circumstances of water use in the state have not changed to
the extent that it is no longer reasonable to continue this use at
the expense of more desirable uses for more urgent needs. It
should receive the same treatment as all other non-constitu-
tional beneficial uses. The use before us is beneficial when
considered in the abstract because a non-consumptive use of
29. See BARLOW B URKE, JR. ET AL., MINERAL LAW C ASES AND M ATERIALS 339 (1994) (stating that
in October of 1979 there were eight planned and proposed slurry pipelines, "sounding the advent of
the slurry pipeline development era").
30. In fact, one slurry pipeline effort spawned major water litigation. See ETSI Pipeline Project
v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495 (1988).
31. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 7.6 (West 1997). Montana enacted a similar statute in 1979, but
repealed it in 1985. See MONT. CODE § 85-2-104 (1979) ("[T]he use of water for the slurry transport
of coal is not a beneficial use of water."). Of course there are no immediate prospects for coal slurry
pipeline development, so the threat appears to be over.
32. See generally Frank J. Trelease, The Concept of Reasonable Beneficial Use in the Law of
Surface Streams, 12 Wyo. L.J. 1 (1956).
33. See 2 WATER AND WATER Rtotrrs, supra note 3, § 12.02(c)(2), at 28-34. See, e.g., MONT.
CODE ANN. § 85-2-401(1) (1999):
Priority of appropriation does not include the right to prevent changes by later
appropriators in the condition of water occurrence, such as the increase or decrease of
streamflow or the lowering of a water table, artesian pressure, or water level, if the prior
appropriator can reasonably exercise the water right under the changed conditions.
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water at Malad Canyon to preserve a scenic attraction, both for
aesthetic and recreational purposes, is desirable and beneficial,
and because the demands upon the water resources of this state
are not so severe that this use, which is beneficial when con-
sidered alone, becomes unreasonable and not beneficial when
considered in conjunction with all of the water resource
development needs in the state.34
However, there do not appear to be any instances where courts have de-
clared that a use has terminated because the use though once beneficial
is no longer beneficial. 35 Instead what has happened is the application
of the common law abandonment doctrine 36 and the legislatively im-
posed forfeiture doctrine, 37 both of which are based on nonuse of all or
part of the previously used water. However, the former doctrine focuses
on intent 38 and the latter on time lapse.39
In 1994, in a case where the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service was
seeking a water permit from the state of South Dakota for a wildlife
refuge, 40 protestors cited an early Utah case 41 for the proposition that
appropriating water to cultivate food for wildlife and waterfowl is not a
beneficial use. The South Dakota Supreme Court responded by saying,
"[T]he weight of authority indicates that 'beneficial use is an evolving
concept, and a concept that can be expanded to reflect changes in
society's recognition of the value of new uses of our resources,"' 42 and
by holding that it was not error to conclude that "maintenance and
protection of waterfowl habitat was a beneficial use."43
III. THE USE PREFERENCES THAT HAVE BEEN CREATED
This section delineates four sources of existing use preferences:
(a) common law riparian and groundwater doctrines; (b) federal law
34. State Dep't of Parks v. Idaho Dep't of Water Admin., 530 P.2d 924, 932 (Idaho 1974)
(Bakes, J., concurring).
35. There have been some threats, however. See Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res.
Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1990) (involving Board order to repair defective tailwater structure and to
prepare conservation plan). "It [the District] has only vested rights to the 'reasonable' use of water. It
has no right to waste or misuse water." Id. at 261.
36. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 17.03(a).
37. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 17.03(b).
38. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 17.03(a).
39. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 17.03(b).
40. See In re Water Right Claim No. 1927-2, 524 N.W.2d 855 (S.D. 1994).
41. See Lake Shore Duck Club v. Lake View Duck Club, 166 P. 309 (Utah 1917).
42. In re Water Right Claim No. 1927-2, 524 N.W.2d at 858 (quoting Rick A. Thompson,
Statutory Recognition of Instream Flow Preservation: A Proposed Solution for Wyoming, 17 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 139, 143 (1982)).
43. Id.
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including interstate compacts; (c) public trust doctrine and state
sovereignty; and (d) state statutes and constitutions.
A. COMMON LAW RIPARIAN AND GROUNDWATER DOCTRINES
Under common law riparian doctrine, the natural flow concept
favors nonconsumptive uses over consumptive uses, 4 4 and had early
judicial flirtation with the concept come to full fruition,4 5 certain uses
would have been preferred uses simply by their dependence on natural
flow. However, reasonable use doctrine generally supplanted natural
flow,46 but even with a natural flow concept, the necessity of some con-
sumption was recognized, particularly for domestic use. Under riparian
reasonable use doctrine, domestic use, or as sometimes labeled "natur-
al" use, was to become the preferred use over uses labeled as "arti-
ficial" uses. 47 Thus in any contest between domestic and artificial uses
where there was insufficient water for both, the domestic use would pre-
vail. As to a conflict between domestic users, what authority there is
suggests that natural superiority would prevail,4 8 so that the further
upstream you were, the better protected your right.
One of the early classic cases espousing the domestic/artificial
distinction is Evans v. Merriweather.49 Evans' employee obstructed and
diverted a water course, and Merriweather sued.50 Both Evans and Merri-
weather were operating mills on the water course, and in 1837 during a
drought an employee diverted all of the water so that the watercourse
dried up. 51 The court put the question and answer as follows:
[I]s that a reasonable use of running water by the upper
proprietor, by which the fluid itself is entirely consumed? To
answer this question satisfactorily, it is proper to consider the
wants of man in regard to the element of water. These wants
are either natural or artificial. Natural are such as are absolute-
ly necessary to be supplied, in order to his existence. Artificial,
such only as, by supplying them, his comfort and prosperity
are increased. To quench thirst, and for household purposes,
water is absolutely indispensable. In civilized life, water for
44. See I WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, § 7.02(c).
45. See 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, § 7.02(c).
46. See discussion supra Part II.
47. See I WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, § 7.02(b)(1); see also infra text accompany-
ing note 52.
48. See infra text accompanying note 53.
49. 4 Ill. (3 Scam.) 492 (1842).
50. See Evans v. Merriweather, 4 Ill. (3 Scam.) 492, 494 (1842).
51. See id.
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cattle is also necessary. These wants must be supplied, or both
man and beast will perish. 52
With natural wants "[e]ach proprietor in his turn may, if necessary,
consume all the water for these purposes." 53 But the uses in Evans were
not natural wants, and thus, "the question must be left to the judgment
of the jury, whether the party complained of has used, under all the
circumstances, more than his just proportion."54
As this distinction between domestic and artificial uses developed,
there were of course issues as to what was included within domestic use.
The major issues focused on applicability to a municipality 55 and to
large cattle enterprises. 56 And the Evans court itself acknowledged that
"[i]n . .. a hot and arid climate, water doubtless is absolutely indispens-
able to the cultivation of the soil, and in them, water for irrigation would
be a natural want." 57
As noted in the previous section, under riparian reasonable use
doctrine, no uses were declared per se unreasonable, 58 but it should
also be noted that riparian uses may be controlled by preferred uses
created outside the riparian doctrine system, such as uses sanctioned by
52. Id. at 495.
53. Id. at 496.
54. Id.
55. See Pernell v. City of Henderson, 16 S.E.2d 449, 451 (N.C. 1941), citing, among many
authorities, I HENRY P. FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGTrS 611 (1904):
The rule giving an individual the right to consume water for his domestic needs is
founded upon the needs of the single individual and the possible effect which his use will
have on the rights of others, and cannot be expanded so as to render a collection of
persons numbering thousands, organized into a political unit, a riparian owner, and give
this unit the right of the natural unit.
56. "Ordinary or natural uses have been held to include the use for domestic purposes, including
household purposes, such as cleansing, washing, and supplying an ordinary number of horses or stock
with water ...." Kundel Farms v. Vir-Jo Farms, Inc., 467 N.W.2d 291, 294 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991)
(emphasis added).
Vir-Jo desires to use the water in Crane Creek for watering stock and other agricultural
purposes. Kundel uses the water to make a wetland so four hunters may rent the land for
$1,000 a year. While we find neither use unreasonable, creating a wetland for hunting
certainly is an artificial use. As such Vir-Jo's natural use of the stream to water his
livestock takes precedence.
Id. at 295. However, the court does not mention how many cattle Vir-Jo has. Professor Gross states
that the stock watering privilege was limited to stock "ordinarily kept to sustain the needs of man" and
that it did not extend to where "the primary object is to raise for the market." Gross, supra note 4, at
264 n.5.
57. 4 II. (3 Scam.) at 495. But Professor Gross noted that courts had been "quite hesitant in
classifying irrigation as a natural want." Gross, supra note 4, at 264 n.6.
58. Uses were prohibited on nonriparian land. See 1 WATERS AND WATER RrrGHTS, supra note 2,
§ 7.02(d)(1), at 245-46. However, that is an exception based on location and not on what the water is
used for.
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the public trust doctrine 59 and the public right to navigate. 60 These
preferred uses are discussed later.61
Except for underground water that was treated as part of a surface
stream 62 or that was located in an underground stream, 63 use preferences
did not develop at common law for groundwater.64 In these two except-
ed situations, the same law would apply to the groundwaters as applied to
the surface waters. 65
The law applied to groundwater developed separately from the law
applied to surface waters because of the inability to know what was going
on underground when specific cases about groundwater first arose.
66
Instead, courts adopted principles for solving groundwater disputes that
would allow the courts to solve the disputes without the necessity of look-
ing underground. Thus, the concept of absolute ownership of ground-
water, which allowed the surface owner to capture as much as he could,
developed and still exists in several jurisdictions today.67 However, many
states modified the absolute ownership doctrine by prohibiting malicious
conduct and by prohibiting the wasting of water. 68 These modifications
were possible because neither one required that the courts look under-
ground to make the necessary determination. Later in reviewing the
totality of a state's groundwater law, courts began to conclude that with
these modifications, in reality what the jurisdiction was applying was a
reasonable use rule.69 That appears to be how the American reasonable
use rule came into being.70 This rule looks solely to the conduct of the
water user whose conduct is being complained about71 as contrasted with
the Restatement of Torts reasonable use rule which seeks to balance the
59. See 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 16, § 30.02.
60. See generally 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 16, Part VI.
61. See discussion infra Part III.C.
62. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 11.06(c)(1), at 37-38.
63. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § I 1.06(c)(1), at 36-37.
64. Of course in the balancing process under a reasonable use rule, it may be applied so that
even a prior use "can be extinguished or at least receive a lower preference as against a subsequent
use that is deemed to have a lower preference as against a subsequent use that is deemed to have a
greater economic or social value." James Ellsworth Craig, Comment, Beyond the Cabin on the Bank,
Ohio Groundwater Law in Transition, 13 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 537, 546 (1986).
65. See 3 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 20.07(a) (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 & Supp. 1999).
66. See id. §§ 20.02, 20.03.
67. See generally id. ch. 21.
68. See id. § 21.02.
69. See generally id. ch. 23.
70. See I WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, § 4.05(c).
71. See generally 3 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 65, ch. 23.
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benefits and harms of the respective water uses.72 Only in the applica-
tion of the balancing reasonable use rule might a court extend the
surface water domestic versus artificial uses distinction.
B. FEDERAL LAW (INCLUDING INTERSTATE COMPACTS 73)
Navigation was an important historical use of water in the United
States 74 and is still important in many areas of the United States.75 The
U.S. Constitution gives Congress power to "regulate Commerce . . .
among the several States." 76 Because early commerce occurred primari-
ly on the waterways, Congress early on established power over navigable
waters, 77 and to this day federal approval is required by a government or
individual before any alteration can be made in navigable waters. 7 8
Because federal law is the supreme law of the land,79 navigation becomes
a preferred use and any use inconsistent therewith is, or can be, subordi-
nated; that use still trumps although there are limits on its scope.80
Congress can of course determine that navigation shall not maintain a
preferred status as it has done in some of its water-related legislation. 81
The early interest in navigation was followed by other federal inter-
ests. With the Reclamation Act of 1902,82 the Federal Power Act of
1920,83 the Flood Control Acts of 1928,84 1936,85 1944,86 and 1948,87
72. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858 (1977); 3 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note
65, § 20.07(b)(5).
73. See Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm'n, 769 F.2d 568, 570 (9th Cir.
1985) ("Thus, as a federal law, the Compact authorizes those actions included within its provisions.").
74. See JOSEPH K. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATERCOURSES § 536 (6th ed. 1869).
75. See I WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, § 2.04(i).
76. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 8, cl. 3.
77. See Gilman v. City of Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865), for a discussion of the ex-
tent to which Congress had exercised power over navigation and a recognition of Congress's power to
act further. See also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). See generally 4 WATERS AND
WATER RIGrs, supra note 16, § 35.02.
78. See Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, ch. 425, § 9, 30 Stat. 1151 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-467n (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
79. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
80. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
81. See Flood Control Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-534, § 1(c), 58 Stat. 887, 889 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 701-1(b) (1994), referred to as the O'Mahoney-Milliken Amendment, and
extended to other legislation); see also Gene Olson, The O'Mahoney-Milliken Amendments: The West
Sinks the Navigation Power, 65 N.D. L. REV. 91, 112-126 (1989); infra text accompanying notes 112-
13.
82. Ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.); see also 4
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 16, § 41.02.
83. Ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 7 9 1-823a (1994 & Supp. IV
1998)); see also 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 16, § 40.02.
84. Ch. 569, 45 Stat. 534 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 702a-702m (1994)).
85. Ch. 688, 49 Stat. 1570.
86. Pub. L. No. 78-534, ch. 665, 58 Stat. 887.
87. Ch. 771, 62 Stat. 1182 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 701s (1994)). Numerous other
acts amended and added to the base acts identified in the text. See 5 WATERS AND WATER R iGHTS,
supra note 6, § 60.03.
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and the Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act of 1954,88 Con-
gress exercised substantial control over the water resources of the United
States. In several instances Congress even acted to apportion source
waters among several states. 89
Preferences for the use of water have been created as a result of at
least some of this federal legislation. Under the Reclamation Act, a
preference for irrigation was established. 90 With the Federal Power Act a
preference for damming streams and generating power was created.9 1
Despite the fact that Congress specified multiple purposes for flood
control projects, 92 federal management gave low priority to some uses,
particularly recreational use, 93 thus favoring other uses, particularly
navigation. 94 While all of these preferences have been, or are being,
modified to some extent, 95 it cannot be said that they have been fully
abrogated.
Then, with the Wilderness Act of 1964,96 the Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act enacted in 1968,97 and the Endangered Species Act of 1973,98
Congress moved into new areas of concern that have a direct relationship
with the water resource-environmental and ecosystem protection. 99
88. Pub. L. No. 83-566, ch. 656, 68 Stat. 666 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1008
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998)); see also 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 6, § 60.05(b).
89. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (interpreting the Boulder Canyon Project Act
of 1928, Pub. L. No. 642, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 617-617t (1994)),
as having apportioned the lower Colorado River among Arizona, California, and Nevada). The
Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-618, Tit. II, 104
Stat. 3289 (1990), apportions the waters of Lake Tahoe and the Truckee and Carson Rivers between
California and Nevada. See 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 16, § 47.01(b).
90. See 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 16, § 41.02. This preference hinders the trans-
fer of water to other needed uses. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 14.01(b)(1).
91. See 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 16, §§ 40.02, 40.07; see also First Iowa
Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
92. See, e.g., Flood Control Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 1570, 1572 § 5 (1936) ("for the benefit of
navigation and the control of destructive flood waters and other purposes").
93. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CORPS' MANAGEMENT OF ONGOING DROUGHT IN THE
MISSOURI RIVER BASIN 4-5 (1992).
94. See id. at 3.
95. See, e.g., A Fight Over Fish and Birds Heats Up the Struggle for Control of the Missouri
River, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, July 23, 2000, at A 12.
96. Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1994));
see also Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405 (10th Cir. 1990); 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra
note 16, § 37.03(a)(5).
97. Pub. L. No. 90-542, 82 Stat. 906 (1968) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998)); see also 4 WATERS AND WATER RIoHTS, supra note 16, § 37.03(a)(4).
98. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543
(1994)).
99. There are of course many other federal statutes relating to water, particularly the quality of
water, such as the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86
Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)), and the
Safe Drinking Water Act enacted in 1974, 88 Stat. 1661 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 300f to 300j-26 (1994)), but these cannot be said to establish preferred uses, although some uses
may get prohibited because of an inability to meet quality standards and limitations.
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These laws also implicate preferred uses, except to the extent that the
federal government has indicated that there shall be no preference. 00 At
least the first two of these Acts implicate federal reserved water rights; 101
thus it becomes necessary to discuss the scope of such rights.
Because federal reserved rights are established under the supreme
law of the land,102 they come into being without complying with state law
and have preferred status over subsequently created state water rights.1
03
Because these reserved water rights focus on particular uses and are
measured by how much water is necessary for that use, 104 they are
properly considered as a part of use preference law. Reserved water
rights may come into being when the federal government sets aside, or
"reserves" public lands for a particular purpose, whether as a national
forest or a national park, or as in the case of the two acts noted above,
wilderness and wild and scenic rivers. 105 Based on the notion that only
such water as is necessary for the principal purpose or purposes of the
reservation, the United States Supreme Court found, in United States v.
New Mexico, 106 that the reserved right for national forests is limited to the
water necessary for timber production and for watershed protection,
rejecting water claims for fish, wildlife, recreation, stockwatering, and
aesthetic purposes.l07
Other federal statutes that establish statutory preferences for certain
types of uses, do not necessarily implicate reserved rights. Thus under
the Endangered Species Act, 108 no reserved right comes into being,109
100. See the differences of opinion expressed in In re SRBA, No. 39576, 1999 WL 778325
(Idaho Oct. 1, 1999), superseded on reh'g sub. nom. Potlach Corp. v. United States, 12 P.3d 1260
(Idaho 2000), as to the creation of wilderness areas.
101. See In re SRBA, 1999 WL 778325 (Idaho 1999). In 16 U.S.C. § 1284(c), Congress
expressly reserves water "in quantities ... necessary to accomplish [the wild and scenic rivers']
purposes."
102. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564
(1908).
103. See Arizona, 373 U.S. 546; Winters, 207 U.S. 564.
104. See 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 16, § 37.02(c).
105. See 4 WATERS AND WATER RiHTs, supra note 16, § 37.03(a), where the author discusses
eight categories. Reserved rights developed first in the context of Indian reservations, but such
reservations could have been reserved either by the Indians themselves or by the federal government
for the Indians. See 4 WATERS AND WATER RIHTS, supra note 16, § 37.01(b).
106. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
107. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 718 (1978); see also Janet C. Neuman &
Michael C. Blumm, Water for National Forests: The Bypass Flow Report and the Great Divide in
Western Water Law, 18 STANF. ENvTL. L.J. 3 (1999); Eric T. Freyfogle, Repairing the Waters of the
National Parks: Notes on a Long-term Strategy, 74 DENy. U. L. REV. 815 (1997).
108. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543
(1994)).
109. There are those who argue that such a right should be created and quantified in order to
make the demands on the water resource more certain. See, e.g., Bennett W. Raley, Chaos in the
Making: The Consequences of Failure to Integrate Federal Environmental Statutes with McCarran
Amendment Water Adjudications, 41 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 24-1 (1995); A. Dan Tarlock, The
Endangered Species Act and Western Water Rights, 20 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 13-30 (1985).
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but federal land and water managers are obligated to manage the re-
sources under their jurisdiction so that the management method does not
jeopardize an endangered or threatened species.110 This indeed creates a
preferred use of water for endangered species protection."'
Interstate compacts also contain preferences for various water uses.
The Colorado River Compact" 12 provides that use of the water for naviga-
tion "shall be subservient to the uses of such waters for domestic, agri-
cultural, and power purposes."113 Use of water for generating electric
power is, in turn, made subservient to use of the water for "agricultural
and domestic purposes."114 Under the Snake River Compact"1 5 use of
water for power production is subservient to domestic, stock, and irriga-
tion purposes and they are referred to as "preferred purposes.""l 6 The
Belle Fourche River Compact1 7 gives Wyoming, in addition to its alloca-
tion, a right to use water "for domestic and stock use."118 Under the
Canadian River Compact,11 9 Texas's right to impound waters of the
North Canadian River is limited to storage for "municipal uses, for
household and domestic uses, livestock watering, and the irrigation of
lands which are cultivated solely for the purpose of providing food and
feed for the householders and domestic livestock actually living or kept
on the property."1 20 The Klamath River Basin Compact,121 provides that
when there are competing applications, each state is to give preference
"for a higher use over applications for a lower use in accordance with
the following order of uses: (a) Domestic use, (b) Irrigation use, (c)
Recreational use, including use for fish and wildlife, (d) Industrial use,
(e) Generation of hydroelectric power, (f) Such other uses as are recog-
nized under the laws of the state involved."1 22
110. See 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 6, § 62.02(0(3). Furthermore, private
citizens are prohibited from taking an endangered species. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995). It is possible that under some circumstances
destruction of habitat on private land by a private citizen will result in a taking. See id.
111. See id.; see also Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
112. 70 CONG. REC. 324 (1928). The compact was approved by Congress at 45 Stat. 1057, 1064
(1928).
113. 70 CONG. REC. 325, art. IV(a), at 325.
114. Id., art. IV(b).
115. 64 Stat. 29 (1950).
116. Id., art. V, at 31.
117. 58 Stat. 94 (1944).
118. Id., art. V, at 96. Article VIII of the compact also contains a preference for stock water
use. See id., art VIII, at 97.
119. 66 Stat. 74 (1952).
120. Id., art. V(a), at 75.
121. 71 Stat. 497 (1957).
122. Id., art. III(B)(l), at 498-99.
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C. PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY
The public trust doctrine 123 posits that states hold the title to the
land under navigable waters "in trust for the people of the State that
they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over
them, and have liberty of fishing therein, freed from the obstruction or
interference of private parties."1 24 Because of the uncertainty about the
source of the doctrine,125 it is treated here in a separate section along
with the concept of state sovereignty over land and water, a concept that
the public trust doctrine is often associated with.126 Because of the trust
nature of the title, it is clear that in most, if not all, states there are limits
on the extent to which, if at all, a state -can override the uses of water
contemplated under the trust.127 To the extent that states cannot override
the uses, navigation, commerce, and fishing are preferred uses of the
water. Some jurisdictions apply the doctrine to the water resource itself
and not just to land underlying water.128 And many jurisdictions have
expanded the uses to which the doctrine applies to include recreational
uses. 129
If the public trust doctrine does not create the public right to
navigate, that right must come from some aspect of state sovereignty. 130
Looking at the question of the public right to navigate strictly from a
state sovereignty perspective, and not implicating the public trust doc-
trine, many states are on record as recognizing a right of navigation in
the public.131 Thus the California Supreme Court took quite an assertive
position in 1884: "[N]either state nor federal legislatures could, by
silent acquiescence, or by attempted legislation . . . divest the people
of the state of their rights in the navigable waters of the State for the use
of a private business, however extensive or long continued."1 32 Some
states apply a servitude concept 33 to allow the state to destroy access to
123. See generally 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 16, § 30.02.
124. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
125. See 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 16, § 30.02(a).
126. See 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 16, § 30.02(a).
127. See 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 16, § 30.02(d).
128. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983); United Plainsmen
Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976).
129. See 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 16, § 31.02(a).
130. See supra text accompanying notes 74-81, for discussion of the federal relationship to
navigation.
131. See generally 4 WATERS & WATER RIGHTS, supra note 16, chs. 29, 30. Some states find a
public right to navigate in state constitutional provisions relating to water. See Montana Coalition for
Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088 (Mont. 1984); Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo.
1961).
132. People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 4 P. 1152, 1159 (Cal. 1884).
133. See Colberg, Inc. v. State ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works, 432 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1967).
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water without compensation.134 Other states, however, have rejected that
servitude approach on the basis that access to water is too important.135
D. STATE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONS
State statutes in both riparian and prior appropriation states contain
preferred uses for water. Some prior appropriation states have prefer-
ences in their constitutions as well. For example, Colorado, when it
adopted its constitution in 1876, included the following preference
language:
[W]hen the waters of any natural stream are not sufficient for
the service of all those desiring the use of the same, those using
the water for domestic purposes shall have the preference over
those claiming for any other purpose, and those using the water
for agricultural purposes shall have preference over those
using the same for manufacturing purposes.136
The Idaho1 37 and Nebraska' 38 constitutions contain essentially the same
provisions, but Idaho adds a mining use preference.1 39
Early riparian state statutes focused on establishing preferences for
single uses such as in the Mill Acts. 140 Eighteen of the thirty-one eastern
riparian states have substantial legislative modification of the common
law riparian system, including the establishment of permit systems. 141
Some uses under these statutes do not require permits, which raises the
question as to whether those uses should be treated as preferred uses. 142
Many of these riparian state statutes contain express use priori-
ties. 143 They tend to amplify on the common law division between
domestic, or natural, uses on the one hand, and artificial uses on the
134. See id. In this case the destruction came not to benefit a private business but to benefit the
state in building bridges across the waterway.
135. See, e.g., Wernberg v. State, 516 P.2d 1191, 1201 (Alaska 1973) (stating that there are
"many isolated communities whose only means of access is by water").
136. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6 (emphasis added).
137. See IDAHO CONST. art. XV, § 3; see also State Dep't of Parks v. Idaho Dep't of Water
Admin., 530 P.2d 924 (Idaho 1974); Basinger v. Taylor, 164 P. 522 (Idaho 1917).
138. See NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 6; see also NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-204, 46-613 (1998).
139. See IDAHO CONST. art. XV, § 3 ("And in any organized mining district those using the water
for mining purposes or milling purposes connected with mining, shall have preference over those using
the same for manufacturing or agricultural purposes.").
140. See I WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, § 7.02(b)(2), at 232, § 9.02(a).
141. See 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, § 9.03.
142. Professor Dellapenna so treats them, see 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2,
§ 9.03(a)(3), and I have no particular basis to quarrel with his conclusion. Exemption of domestic
users and agricultural users from the permit requirement seem the most universal. These exemptions
are either express or as a result of the exemption of users of small quantities, who usually will be
located in rural areas. See I WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, § 9.03(a)(3).
143. See I WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, § 9.03(a)(3).
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other hand.144 Thus the Arkansas statute that provides for allocating
water among users during a water shortage specifies that "the commis-
sion may consider the use that each person . . . is to make of the
water." 145 The statute provides overall preference in allocation to: first,
"sustaining life;" second, "maintaining health;" and third, "increasing
wealth."1 46 It specifies as recognized uses: "domestic and municipal
water supply needs, agricultural and industrial water needs, and navi-
gational, recreational, fish and wildlife, and other ecological needs"1
47
but provides that: "The following priorities shall be reserved prior to
allocation: (1) Domestic and municipal domestic; (2) Minimum
streamflow; and (3) Federal water rights."1 48 Although these reser-
vations are listed as "one," "two," and "three," there is no statement as
to order of preference among the three, unlike with the overall prefer-
ences where the statute clearly provides for three levels of priority.1
49
The assumption appears to be that all three of these reserved uses will be
satisfied.
Prior appropriation statutes started out with hierarchical lists that
became longer as uses were subdivided or added and unused water be-
came scarcer. North Dakota exemplifies this evolution with the original
1963 list and its context reading as follows: "In all cases where the use
of water for different purposes conflict such uses shall conform to the
following order of priority: 1. Domestic use. 2. Livestock Use. 3.
Irrigation and industry."150 The revision that North Dakota made in
1977 affected both the list and the context: "When there are competing
applications for water from the same source, and the source is insuffi-
cient to supply all applicants, the state engineer shall adhere to the
following order of priority: 1. Domestic use. 2. Municipal use. 3.
Livestock use. 4. Irrigation use. 5. Industrial use. 6. Fish, wildlife, and
outdoor recreational uses."151
Frank Trelease surveyed all seventeen coterminous western states in
1955152 and indicated that only five states, Montana, Nevada, North
144. See supra text accompanying notes 49-54.
145. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 15-22-217(b) (Michie 2000).
146. Id. § 15-22-217(c).
147. Id. § 15-22-217(d).
148. Id. § 15-22-217(e).
149. See id. § 15-22-217(c).
150. 1963 N.D. Laws ch. 419, § 1 (creating N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01.1 (repealed 1977))
(emphasis added). The statute defined both domestic use and livestock use. See id.
151. 1977 N.D. Laws ch. 569, § 11 (codified as amended at N.D. CENT. CODE § 64-04-06.1
(1995)).
152. See Trelease, supra note 1, at 143-58. Hutchins had done this in 1942. See WELLS A.
HUTCHINS, SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF WATER RIGHTS IN THE WEST 337-45 (USGPO 1942).
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Dakota, South Dakota, and Washington, did not have water use prefer-
ence lists. 153 However, now Montana provides that in "controlled
ground water areas," 154 groundwater withdrawals can be limited "for
domestic and livestock purposes first and then to withdrawals for other
beneficial purposes, including but not limited to agricultural, industrial,
municipal (other than domestic), and recreational purposes, in the order
that the department considers advisable under the circumstances." 155
Nevada also now has a preference provision relating to groundwater.156
North Dakota has the provision already discussed.1 57 South Dakota
provides at least that the "use of water for domestic purposes is the
highest use of water" and is preferred over other uses. 158 Washington
gives authority to the Department of Ecology to reserve water for future
use1 59 and provides that reservations of water by the department "for
agriculture, hydroelectric energy, municipal, industrial, and other benefi-
cial uses . . . or minimum flows or levels . . . shall constitute appropria-
tions." 160 This statutory language appears to give the Department some
authority to establish preferences based on use. Furthermore, Washing-
ton now, like many states,161 establishes minimum stream flows and lake
levels and specifies that its minimum levels are "for the purposes of
protecting fish, game, birds or other wildlife resources, or recreational or
aesthetic values of said public waters." 162 Assuming that it is truly a
minimum that can and will be enforced, Washington is establishing a
preferred use for that water.
153. See Trelease, supra note 1, at 149-50, 151-52, 154, 157.
154. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-506 (1999).
155. Id. § 85-2-507(4)(c).
156. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 534.120(2) (Michie Supp. 1999) (giving the state engineer
authority to designate preferred uses in areas where the groundwater basin is being depleted "within
the following limits: Domestic, municipal, quasi-municipal, industrial, irrigation, mining and
stock-watering uses and any uses for which a county, city, town, public water district or public water
company furnishes the water").
157. See supra text accompanying notes 150-51.
158. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 46-1-5 (Michie 1999). South Dakota generally prohibits transfer of
irrigation water to any but domestic use or fire protection use. See id. § 46-5-34.1. This provision in
effect creates a preference for irrigation use over all uses except domestic or fire protection.
159. See WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 90.54.050 (West Supp. 2000).
160. Id. § 90.03.345 (West 1992).
161. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 13.05(a) (prior appropriation doctrine
states), § 15.03(c)(4)(C) (prior appropriation doctrine states); 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra
note 2, § 9.05(b) (riparian doctrine states).
162. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.22.010 (West Supp. 2000).
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In addition, California, 163 and apparently New Mexico1 64 have used
a concept known as the pueblo rights doctrine to give preference to a
qualifying municipality to the water necessary for municipal uses within
its territorial boundaries. 165 Oeltjen and Fischer refer to the preference
thus established as absolute.166 The settlements would have to have
arisen under Spanish or Mexican law, although there is considerable
controversy over the existence of the concept as a part of either Spanish
or Mexican law.167
If status in the pecking order for water depends on use classifica-
tions, the assignment of a specific use to a particular class would be im-
portant. Use classifications can be ambiguous. In a recent South Dakota
case, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service sought water permits for main-
taining marshes as waterfowl habitat on a National Wildlife Refuge.1 68
The lower court concluded that using. the water to raise crops that would
be harvested by migratory waterfowl constituted irrigation, but held the
operation to be a beneficial use even if the activity was not considered
irrigation.169 The South Dakota Supreme Court concluded that "ap-
propriation of water for waterfowl habitat and other wildlife is a bene-
ficial use." 170 For one of the water rights involved that was a sufficient
determination, but for another water right involved, the court had to fo-
cus on irrigation. This right had originally been given for irrigation and
the protester argued that approving the request would change the use
from irrigation and violate the statutory provision that prevents changing
the use of irrigation water. 171 The South Dakota Supreme Court noted
163. See City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250 (Cal. 1975); City of Los
Angeles v. City of Glendale, 142 P.2d 289 (Cal. 1943); City of San Diego v. Cuyamaca Water Co., 287
P. 475 (Cal. 1930); Vernon Irrigation Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 39 P. 762 (Cal. 1895) (adopting
pueblo rights).
164. See Cartwright v. Public Serv. Co, 343 P.2d 654 (1958); City of Las Vegas v. Oman, 796
P.2d 1121 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990) (adopting pueblo rights). But see State ex rel. Martinez v. City of Las
Vegas, 880 P.2d 868 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) (rejecting pueblo rights), cert. granted, 882 P.2d 21 (N.M.
1994); Pierre Levy, Case Note, Which Right is Right: The Pueblo Water Rights Doctrine Meets Prior
Appropriation, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 413, 413 n.5 (1995) (noting that Martinez was settled prior to oral
argument in the New Mexico Supreme Court).
165. Texas and Colorado have rejected its applicability. See In re Contests of Laredo, 675
S.W.2d 257 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984) (rejecting pueblo rights). In American Water Development, Inc. v.
City of Alamosa, 874 P.2d 352 (Colo. 1994), the Colorado Supreme Court ruled en banc that the
claimant did not have title to the groundwater underlying Baca Grant No. 4. First, the Grant did not
derive from either the Mexican government or its Spanish predecessors. See id. at 362-64. Second,
the Act of June 21, 1860, did not carry water fights that would have been recognized by the Mexican
or Spanish governments. See id. at 365-66. This decision disposes of a major claim, if not the only
one, to application of Spanish or Mexican law to water fights in Colorado.
166. See Oeltjen & Fischer, supra note 4, at 262.
167. See Martinez, 880 P.2d 868.
168. In re Water Right Claim No. 1927-2, 524 N.W.2d 855 (S.D. 1994).
169. See id.
170. Id. at 858.
171. Under South Dakota law irrigation fights can be transferred apart from appurtenant land
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that the water "would provide habitat for waterfowl, including sloughs
and marshlands with plant growth essential for waterfowl survival and
propagation. Under . . . [the South Dakota regulations' 72] the use
remains for 'irrigation' by providing moisture for plant growth."1 73 As
noted above,174 South Dakota does not have a preference list as such.
But most prior appropriation doctrine states do, and in most lists, use of
water for irrigation is ranked much higher than use for wildlife. Thus
under the North Dakota preference list,175 where would this refuge use
go? Would it be placed in category (4), "irrigation," or in category (6),
"fish, wildlife and outdoor recreational uses"? Similarly, if a classifica-
tion scheme distinguished between agriculture and fish and wildlife,
where would fish farming, a rapidly growing business,176 be placed?
IV. FUNCTIONS SERVED BY THE EXISTING STATUTORY
PREFERENCE LISTS
In 1955 Dean Trelease, in writing about state created use preference
lists, concluded:
Throughout this mass of law runs a single unifying thread:
some uses are more important than others and should receive
some type of favored treatment. Yet it is strikingly apparent
that the diversities in the law far outnumber the similarities.
There is wide variation as to what shall be preferred and how
the preference is to operate. There is general agreement only
in that man's personal needs come first, so that domestic and
municipal purposes head every list, and there seems to be a
fairly uniform resolve not to let waters run unused into the seas,
with the consequence that power and navigation operations are
generally found near the bottom.177
But whatever the order of preference, Professor Gross, in his 1965 article
on use preferences, summed up how the existing preferences operate:
In general, preferences have been applied in three ways: (1) as
a consideration by the state agency weighing pending applica-
tions for appropriative rights; (2) in the granting of conditional
only for ordinary household purposes or fire protection. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 46-5-34.1 (Michie
1999). This appears to give water used for irrigation, once in existence, a high preference.
172. See S.D. ADMIN. R. 74:02:01:01(4).
173. In re Water Claim Right, 524 N.W.2d at 859-60.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 153, 158.
175. See supra text accompanying note 151.
176. See Karen Binder, Getting Hooked: Aquaculture Opportunities Tailor-made for Many
Farmers Throughout the Region, SoUrTHERN ILLINOISAN, Oct. 1, 2000, at CI, col. 2.
177. Trelease, supra note 1, at 158. Oeltjen and Fischer concur in the finding of top priority for
domestic use, noting, however, that what is meant by domestic use "varies from state to state." Oeltjen
& Fischer, supra note 4, at 260.
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appropriation rights-made subject to subsequent preferred
uses; and (3) as a basis for exercising the sovereign power of
eminent domain.178
Because of the historical interconnection among these three ways, it
would not be productive to attempt discussing each one separate and
apart from the others, although generally Gross's order will be followed
in this discussion.
Apparently at least some of the state statutory preferred use lists
were intended to condition permits or licenses for lower preference uses
to allow those uses to be cut off without having to pay compensation
when a higher use came along.179 However, such an interpretation was
generally either rejected by courts in the west or ignored by administra-
tors. Rejection likely came on the basis that such a condition might
discourage development of the water resource if the user knew that to-
morrow it could be taken away without any compensation. Any develop-
ment, whatever the water use, was to be preferred over no development,
thus avoiding letting any water run to the sea. The result is that some
state preferred use lists are simply lists to steer the first time allocations
of water from a source, thus generally applying now only to favor one
competing application over another. However, in many states preferred
use lists may be used to allow a higher preferred use to condemn an
existing lower preferred use. About the only situation any longer in
which a preferred use list may lead to a true preference, that is may be
used to stop an existing lower use in favor of an existing higher use is
when there is a drought or other water emergency. 180 We may all be
familiar with no lawn watering or car washing. 181 Thus, for example, the
Utah Code provides that "in times of scarcity, while priority of ap-
propriation shall give the better right as between those using water for
the same purpose, the use for domestic purposes, without unnecessary
waste, shall have preference over use for all other purposes, and use for
agricultural purposes shall have preference over use for any other
purpose except domestic use." 182 Finally, it is clear that today some
178. Gross, supra note 4, at 267.
179. Such a statute would have to qualify as a defense to a taking action under Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
180. Other causes of water shortages include a broken dam that sends a water supply cascading
down the stream and a flood or other catastrophe that has contaminated a source of supply.
181. See generally I WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, §§ 2.02, 2.03.
182. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-21 (1989). In the eastern United States, to get an idea of
variability, compare Iowa and Maryland. In a water supply emergency under Maryland law, users
with permits are given the following order of preference: "(1) Domestic and municipal uses for
sanitation, drinking water, and public health and safety; (2) Agricultural uses, including the processing
of agricultural products; and (3) All other uses." MD. CODE ANN., ENvIR. § 5-502(d) (Supp. 2000). In
a water supply emergency under Iowa law, uses can be suspended or restricted in the following order:
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preferred use lists if not aiding in forced reallocation, impose limits on
reallocation. 183
Although Gross, in the above excerpt, 184 says simply that preference
lists are to be "a consideration" in the application for a water right
process, that observation should be treated as a generality that encom-
passes different ways of "considering" the use categories in deciding
whether or not to grant an application. Some statutes are explicit that the
agency "shall" prefer higher uses over lower ones.185 Some statutes
that provide for a particular water-related use may also be establishing
the priority level for that use. That certainly is what the federal and state
endangered species acts have accomplished.1 86 Similarly, federally and
state recognized public rights to navigate get high priority because of the
source of the right. 187 While there has been considerable debate over
how that top priority ought to be integrated or not integrated into a
state's existing water allocation scheme where the priority originates
outside that scheme,188 there is no doubt as to its number one priority for
water in any given state. Similarly, the protection accorded wetlandsI 89 is
a mandatory use preference for all of the uses that are served by the
existence of wetlands, which may vary from pollution control to wildlife
habitat.
a. Water conveyed across state boundaries.
b. Uses of water primarily for recreational or aesthetic purposes.
c. Uses of water for the irrigation of hay, corn, soybeans, oats, grain
sorghum or wheat.
d. Uses of water for the irrigation of crops other than hay, corn, soybeans,
oats, grain sorghum or wheat.
e. Uses of water for manufacturing or other industrial processes.
f. Uses of water for generation of electric power for public consumption.
g. Uses of water for livestock production.
h. Uses of water for human consumption and sanitation supplied by rural
water districts, municipal water systems, or other public water supplies
i. Uses of water for human consumption and sanitation supplied by a
private water supply ....
IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.266(2) (West 1997).
183. See infra text accompanying notes 228-30.
184. See supra text accompanying note 178.
185. Thus, Arizona law provides that "preference shall be given by the director according to the
relative values to the public of the proposed use." ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-157(A) (West Supp.
2000). "The relative values to the public for the purposes of this section shall be: 1. Domestic and
municipal uses .... 2. Irrigation and stock watering. 3. Power and mining uses. 4. Recreation and
wildlife, including fish. 5. Nonrecoverable water storage pursuant to 45-833.01." Id. § 45-157(B).
186. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (prohibiting completion of a dam to
protect the snail darter); see also Central Platte Nat. Res. Dist. v. City of Fremont, 549 N.W.2d 112
(Neb. 1996); Kyra Epstein, Columbia Dam Almost Demolished, Land Use up for Debate, U.S. WATER
NEWS, Dec. 1999, at 5, col. I ("[M]ussel derails $85 million worth of construction [in Duck River,
Tennessee.]").
187. See supra text accompanying notes 74-81, 130-35.
188. See supra note 109.
189. See 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 6, § 61.03(c).
[VOL. 76:753
2000] USE PREFERENCES FOR WATER 773
There may also be some state statutes that provide for absolute
preferences. 190 The approach in Bakes' opinion' 9 1 to the Idaho consti-
tutionally preferred uses appears to treat those preferred uses as entitled
to an absolute preference over nonconstitutional uses. But would Bakes
treat a future constitutional use such that it could displace an ongoing
nonconstitutional use without payment of compensation?1 92
Whereas many of the early statutes did not contain any language as
to how they were to operate, many now do contain such language.193
The North Dakota statutesl 94 are instructive. The 1963 statute did not
contain any specification as to how the preferred use list was to oper-
ate, 195 but in the 1977 revised statute, the legislature specified how it was
to operate.196
Another way in which the preferences may be considered in con-
nection with an application is to measure the applied for use as against
future uses. Thus the Utah Code provides:
If the state engineer . . . has reason to believe that an
application to appropriate water will interfere with its more
beneficial use for irrigation, domestic or culinary, stock water-
ing, power or mining development or manufacturing, or will
unreasonably affect public recreation or the natural stream
environment, or will prove detrimental to the public welfare, it
190. See Stephen S. Gealy, Comment, Protection Unlimited: A Preferred User's Right to Means
of Groundwater Diversion in Nebraska, 62 NEB. L. REV. 270, 289 (1983), which suggests that while
Nebraska's preference system for surface water is based on condemnation, the groundwater prefer-
ence statute appears to provide "a system of absolute preferences." The Nebraska groundwater
preference statute, however, reads like the Colorado Constitution provision, quoted supra text
accompanying note 136, which has been held limited to use of eminent domain. See NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 46-613 (1998).
191. See supra text accompanying note 34.
192. California's preference for domestic use in drought emergency does not require a water
district to favor potential domestic users over existing nondomestic users. See Building Indus. Ass'n v.
Main Mun. Water Dist., I Cal. Rptr. 2d 625 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). A developer wanting to build 151
housing units to which the district's moratorium on new hookups applied had argued for the broader
preference for domestic use. See id.; see also A. Dan Tarlock, Western Water Law, Global Warming,
and Growth Limitations, 24 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 979, 999-1012 (1991); Dennis J. Herman, Note, Some-
times There's Nothing Left to Give: The Justification for Denying Water Services to New Customers to
Control Growth, 44 STAN. L. REV. 429 (1992).
193. The "shall" prefer language has already been noted. See supra note 185; see also MiNN.
STAT. ANN. § 103G.261 (West 1997) ("The commissioner shall adopt rules for allocation of waters
based on the following priorities for the consumptive appropriation and use of water .... "). For
application of the priorities without rules having been adopted, see Crookston Cattle Co. v. Department
of Natural Resources, 300 N.W.2d 769 (Minn. 1980).
194. See statutes cited supra notes 150-51; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-707 (1997); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 41-3-103 (Michie 1999).
195. See supra text accompanying note 150.
196. See supra text accompanying note 151; see also infra text accompanying note 228.
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is his duty to withhold his approval or rejection until he has
investigated .... 197
In Tanner v. Bacon198 the Utah Supreme Court upheld the rejection of
plaintiff's application for the use of water for power purposes, in the
face of a publicly sponsored irrigation project then only in the planning
stage.199
Although the language in the Colorado Constitution 200 could have
been interpreted as establishing a true preference so that whenever a
conflict occurred between any two of the three listed uses, the person
with the more preferred use would prevail, it was not so interpreted. 201
Such an interpretation would have meant in effect that any manufacturer
who spent money to divert and use water did so under the condition that
at any time (even a week later) someone else could come along and start
an agricultural use that would trump the manufacturing use. Instead, the
court held that the prior use had vested, and while indeed the more
preferred use could trump the earlier less preferred use, it could be
accomplished only with the payment of compensation to the less pre-
ferred use. While this would be a sound legal decision as to any use that
antedated the constitutional provision, it did not appear to be a sound
legal decision as to uses commenced after the provision became
effective. 202 Instead the decisions seem to have been based on policy
and not law. The problem with any interpretation other than the one the
court gave to the provision was the uncertainty over whether anyone
would ever invest money in manufacturing if such investors were under
that type of risk of losing the water necessary for the enterprise, and thus
losing the investment.203
One way that a conditioned water right might work is illustrated in
O'Neill v. United States,204 involving water provided through a U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation contract. In O'Neill, the customer was entitled to
a specified quantity of water from the Bureau facility under a contract
that had been entered into between the parties. The contract contained
197. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-8(1) (1989); accord ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.090 (Michie 2000).
198. 136 P.2d 957 (Utah 1943).
199. See Tanner v. Bacon, 136 P.2d 957, 964 (Utah 1943). "That domestic use is the most
beneficial use for water and that irrigation is the next most beneficial use in the arid western states is a
self-evident and well recognized fact regardless of any statute." Id. at 963.
200. See supra text accompanying note 136.
201. Thomas, supra note 4, develops the interpretation history not only of the Colorado
Constitutional provision, but also of the comparable Idaho and Nebraska constitutional provisions.
202. The subsequent uses would be taken subject to the condition that they must give way in the
face of a preferred use.
203. "The higher the probability of divestment, the less likely owners would be to invest in irriga-
tion works or other facilities which are necessary in order to use the water." Oeltjen & Fischer, supra
note 4, at 263.
204. 50F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1995).
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an exculpatory clause that provided in part that "in no event shall any
liability accrue against the United States ... for any damages ... arising
from a shortage on account of errors in operation, drought, or any other
causes."205 Because of problems with winter-run chinook salmon and
other species, Congress provided in legislation enacted in 1992206 that a
specified amount of water was to be dedicated to species protection. 207
The result was that the Bureau could only provide fifty percent of the
water that the contracting party would otherwise have been entitled to
receive.208 The O'Neill Court held that when legislation creates a short-
age of water for contract purposes, it constitutes shortage from "any
other cause" under the exculpatory clause, and the government is not
liable.209
Previous writers who have written about preferred uses have relied
principally on provisions in Texas and California law to illustrate the
conditional approach. 210 The Texas statute provided that "an appropri-
ation . . . for any purpose other than domestic or municipal use is sub-
ject to the right of any city or town to make further appropriations of the
water for domestic or municipal use without paying for the water." 2 11
Thus presumably, and according to the writers, any water right issued
after this statute became law in 1931 was a conditional right, conditioned
upon no city or town deciding to appropriate more water at a time when
there was no unappropriated water left in the source. While this statute
has been repealed, 212 water rights are frequently obtained subject to
some conditions.213 For example, in A & B Irrigation District v. Idaho
Conservation League,214 the Idaho Supreme Court considered whether
what in Idaho are termed "general provisions" should be imposed in
the on:going general adjudication process. The court concluded that a
205. O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 683 (9th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added).
206. See Central Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, Tit. XXXIV, 106 Stat.
4706 (1992).
207. See id. § 3406, at 4714 ("Fish, wildlife and habitat restoration"); see also O'Neill, 50 F.3d at
681.
208. See O'Neill, 50 F.3d at 681.
209. See id. at 684.
210. See Trelease, supra note 1, at 134-37, 155; Gross, supra note 4, at 267-68; Oeltjen &
Fischer, supra note 4, at 262-63.
211. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.028 (repealed 1997); see also Sherry Lynn Peel, Acquisition of
Municipal Water Rights in Texas: A Conceptual and Operational Analysis, 17 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 811
(1986). However, apparently the statute was never so applied, and in 1997 it was repealed. See 1997
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 1010, § 9.01 (Vernon). The legislature instead adopted a system of emergen-
cy authorizations to deal with drought, but these may require payment of compensation. See TEX.
WATER CODE ANN. § 11.139 (Vernon 2000).
212. See supra note 211.
213. See City of Albuquerque v. Reynolds, 379 P.2d 73, 81-82 (N.M. 1963); East Bay Mun. Dist.
v. Department of Pub. Works, 35 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Cal. 1934).
214. 958 P.2d 568 (Idaho 1997).
7752000]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
general provision that provides that firefighting is an alternate use for
water for which any water right may be used 2 15 was an appropriate
general provision. Thus a general provision can be both enlarging and
limiting. 216
The California statute provides that the State Water Resources
Control Board is to issue water permits on "such terms and conditions as
in its judgment will best develop, conserve, and utilize in the public
interest the water sought to be appropriated." 2 17 California v. United
States218 is one of the landmark cases involving California's attachment
of conditions to water permits. Here the Board had attached twenty-five
conditions to permits given to the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation to fill the
New Melones Dam. While many of the conditions are pre-conditions to
the ability to exercise the water right, there are also conditions that apply
after the water right has been exercised. 219 In East Bay Municipal Utility
District v. Department of Public Works, 220 the condition, which was up-
held, provided: "The right to store and use water for power purposes
under this permit shall not interfere with future appropriations of said
water for agricultural or municipal purposes." 221
Many statutes specifically provide for the use of eminent domain in
relation to the water resource. While many of the statutes appear to re-
late only to obtaining access to a water source and to rights of way for
transporting water, some clearly relate to condemning water or water
rights to be used for specified uses. Those uses are in that sense pre-
ferred uses. These powers may be identified in state constitutions, 222
215.
a. Firefighting purposes is an alternate use for which any water right may be used, and
firefighting is recognized as a lawful use of water with or without a water right.
b. Firefighting purposes means the use of water in times of emergency: to extinguish an
existing fire on private or public lands, facilities, or equipment; to prevent an existing
fire from spreading to private or public lands, facilities, or equipment within the
vicinity of and endangered by an existing fire; and by firefighting personnel engaged
in fighting an existing fire. Firefighting purposes does not include the use of water to
prevent a fire from occurring in the future, the use of water for domestic purposes in
regularly maintained firefighting stations, or the storage of water for fighting future
fires.
A & B Irrigation Dist. v. Idaho Conservation League, 958 P.2d 568, 574 (Idaho 1997).
216. See id.
217. CALIF. WATER CODE § 1253 (West 1971); accord Trelease, supra note 1, at 136; Gross,
supra note 4, at 268.
218. 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
219. See California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 652 n.8 (1978).
220. 35 P.2d 1027 (Cal. 1934).
221. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist. v. Department of Pub. Works, 35 P.2d 1027, 1027 (Cal. 1934).
222. See the discussion of the Colorado constitutional provision, supra text accompanying notes
200-03.
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procedural statutes, 223 municipal enabling legislation, 224 and in the water
laws. 2
2 5
V. USE PREFERENCES IN THE FUTURE
This section considers both what use preferences should exist in the
future and how they should be used in water resource allocation, al-
though each aspect is not examined as a separate entity.
Summarizing the ways in which water use preferences have been
applied in the past, we can identify four categories: (1) to discriminate
among competing applications for water permits; (2) to reserve water for
one or more preferred uses in the future; (3) to limit or encourage trans-
fer of water use from lower to higher preferred use categories whether
through voluntary transfer or through the use of eminent domain; and
(4) to allocate water during drought or other water emergency.
Trelease pointed out in 1955: "Where water uses already approach
the maximum level, establishing a system of preferences between future
appropriations may accomplish little. The power to choose the more
desirable of pending applications likewise may be of little effect unless
applications for major projects happen to coincide." 226 With full appro-
priation of most sources of water in much of the west, and the limited
opportunity to generate new supplies, the focus for new water uses there
has turned to reallocation. 227
So if reallocation rather than initial allocation is to be the mode in
some areas, the question becomes how do preferences play out in re-
allocation? Some state statutes specifically relate the preferred use pro-
visions to reallocation. North Dakota, for example, provides: "A
change in the purpose of use [of a water permit] may be authorized only
for a superior use as determined by the order of priorities ... ."228 The
reference to "order of priorities" is apparently to North Dakota's
223. However it is questionable whether these statutes apply to more than allowing condemnation
of rights of way to transport water. See, e.g., IDAHOCODE § 7-703 (Michie 1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12-1111 (West 1994). Although Arizona law provides specifically that a person's "use in the
water of a stream, river or spring" can be condemned, such condemnation would appear limited to the
purposes contained in § 12-1111. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1113 (West 1994).
224. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-6-201 (2000) (condemnation of water rights by municipali-
ties); UTAH CODE A NN. § 10-7-4 (municipal acquisition of water supply). For a discussion of eminent
domain for municipalities in riparian jurisdictions, see 1 WATERS AND WATER RIHTS, supra note 2, §
7.04(b).
225. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-707 (1997); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-103 (Michie 1999).
Often this right is limited to acquiring rights of way for transporting water rather than the water itself.
See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-6 (1989).
226. Trelease, supra note 1, at 160.
227. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 14.01(b)(l).
228. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-15.1(3) (1995).
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preferred use list,229 because that list is an "order of priority." 230 Under
this provision, the question noted earlier, 231 whether North Dakota courts
would categorize the use of water to raise food for waterfowl as "4" in
the list, "irrigation use," as the South Dakota Supreme Court did,232 or
as "6," "fish, wildlife, and other outdoor recreation uses" becomes
important.
Oeltjen and Fischer point out that "Most of the current restrictions
on water rights, as well as the various use preferences, impede the move-
ment of rights to water toward their highest and best uses." 233 They are
not speaking of a highest use established in a statutory list but rather a
highest use established through the market. 234 Experience shows that the
significant movement of water rights in the western United States to date
has been from irrigation use to serving municipal needs (domestic, com-
mercial, and some industrial) and to serving environmental and ecologi-
cal needs. 235 The preference for irrigation use specified under federal
projects legislation has impeded this movement. 236 While there has been
some change in federal preference policy, 2 37 it is by no means fully
accomplished.
While generally the eastern riparian doctrine states have been con-
sidered water rich when compared with the western prior appropriation
doctrine states, eighteen of the eastern riparian states have enacted permit
systems apparently because of disruption from droughts and perhaps a
perception that water is fully or at least heavily used even without
droughts. 238 However, in other areas of the east, water allocation works
229. See supra text accompanying note 151.
230. Id.; see also supra note 158.
231. See supra text accompanying note 175.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 168-73.
233. Oeltjen & Fischer, supra note 4, at 281.
Because of the inflexibility inherent in preference systems, and especially those which
are established by constitution or statute, these provisions will likely become significant
obstacles to the rational use of water. At best these schemes reflect values which are not
likely to continue to represent the most beneficial use of water resources under changing
conditions.
Oeltjen & Fischer, supra note 4, at 260.
234. See Oeltjen & Fischer, supra note 4, at 269-81. Not everyone agrees that markets can work
to any great extent in the water resource allocation arena. See, e.g., 1 WATERS AND WATER R IGHTS,
supra note 2, § 7.04. Furthermore, it is unrealistic to expect much for it.
235. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 14.01(b)(1), at 4-5.
236. See id.; see also 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 16, § 41.06(a) (Supp. 2000).
237. See United States Department of the Interior, Assessment '87, 4 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS, supra note 16, app. 41B (Supp. 2000). In the Central Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub. L.
No. 102-575, Tit. XXXIV, 106 Stat. 4706 (1992), Congress provided that water can be transferred for
any purpose "recognized as beneficial under applicable State law." Id. § 3405, 106 Stat. at 4710.
238. See 1 WATERS ANDWATER RiGHrs, supra note 2, § 9.03. Consider simply the ongoing contro-
versy over certain rivers among Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. See 6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 5,
8-16, 55, 59-60 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1994 & Supp. 2000).
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essentially under the common law.239 In a few of the permit states, the
permit system may not extend to the entire state, but may deal only with
selected areas where significant problems are perceived to exist denomi-
nated, for example, critical areas. 240 However, at times acquiring water
supplies for municipalities in the eastern United States has been as
difficult as doing so in the west.241
Dean Trelease wrote of the eminent domain statutes in 1955:
"Little used to date, these statutes may provide a future method of
readjusting water uses when maximum development has been reached, if
the pattern of that development is not making the maximum contri-
bution to the public welfare." 24 2 In 1965 Gross put the future of
condemnation more positively and emphatically than Trelease did:
The statutory preference, as old as the system of prior appro-
priation and yet relatively untested as a vehicle of avoiding
vested rights, appears to be the coming means for readjusting
water uses when demanded by the changing times and circum-
stances. As the definition of "public use" slowly changes to
encompass the use of water by an individual for an individual,
the implementation of such preferences by condemnation pro-
ceedings will become a common occurrence, and the protec-
tion presently granted prior rights and uses will be replaced by
an adjudication as to which of the conflicting uses is "most
necessary" in light of present circumstances and the legislative
intention. In this way will the prior appropriation system
deteriorate as an effective water rights system, the victim of an
inflexibility similar to that of which the riparian doctrine was
cured by Justice Story over 150 years ago.2 43
However Gross considers condemnation a "post-malady relief' and pre-
fers "preventative cures" such as awarding only conditional water rights
and setting water aside for anticipated future uses. 244 The principal
question about the utility of condemnation is its availability to an indivi-
dual for personal use. Professor Gross discusses this issue at length and
notes that several jurisdictions, even in the western United States, have
rejected the use of eminent domain by private individuals. 245 However
private individuals in some western United States have been allowed to
239. See I WATERS AND WATER RIGrrs, supra note 2, § 9.03.
240. See I WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, § 9.03(a)(5)(A).
241. See 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, § 7.05(c).
242. Trelease, supra note 1, at 138.
243. Gross, supra note 4, at 283.
244. See Gross, supra note 4, at 270. But see supra text accompanying note 226.
245. See Gross, supra note 4, at 272-76.
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condemn access to water and rights of way for transporting water,2 46 but
would those courts extend that to condemning the water or water right
itself?247 Thus, even if the statutes were broad enough to encompass
both,248 a real question about what the courts would do exists.
Furthermore there are limits on transferability whatever the mode;
in particular, the perceived need for area of origin protection, designed
to assure that water source areas are not left to wither on the vine.
249
The Oeltjen and Fischer observation about impeding the market
250
raises the question of what, if any, use preferences should exist in the
future. In considering the future of water use law and regulation in the
eastern United States, Professor Abrams 251 rejects both importing prior
appropriation doctrine from the west and continuing the current statuto-
ry regulation that exists in the east. The latter he criticizes for "[1] its
rigidity, [2] its tendency to overregulate, and [3] its lack of articulated
policy objectives." 252  The rigidity objection focuses on the permit
being user specific and not transferable separate from the land benefitted
by the use. 253 The overregulation objection focuses on users who are
not a part of the allocation problem that led to the enactment of the
statutes being forced to participate in the regulation. 254 The lack of
articulated policy objection focuses on lack of guidance in the legisla-
tion, resulting in the administrative agency in charge of making water
allocation decisions doing so on an ad hoc basis rather than in the con-
text of integrated water system management. 255 The solution Abrams
proposes is "giving legal protection to the most important uses of the
water,"256 resulting in a hierarchical preference based permit system.
Abrams puts as his most important use supporting concentrated
human populations and, therefore, would give that a preference over all
other uses.257 He notes that although domestic use requires substantial
246. See Gross, supra note 4, at 274.
247. Although seeking to ascertain Texas law on the subject, the article by Professor Johnson is a
comprehensive and excellent general treatment of the subject. See Corwin W. Johnson, Condem-
nation of Water Rights, 46 TEx. L. REV. 1054 (1968).
248. And many are not. See generally Gross, supra note 4; statutes cited supra notes 223, 225.
249. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RiGTrrs, supra note 3, § 14.04(d)(2).
250. See supra text accompanying note 233.
251. Robert H. Abrams, Replacing Riparianism in the Twenty-First Century, 36 WAYNE L. REV.
93 (1989).
252. Id. at 98.
253. See I WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, § 9.03(d).
254. Regulation, but through a designation of critical areas approach, addresses this criticism.
255. See Abrams, supra note 251, at 98.
256. Abrams, supra note 251, at 98.
257. See Abrams, supra note 251, at 99. Essentially Dean Trelease agreed: "[O]bviously the
uses that are directly necessary to human life and health come first." Trelease, supra note 1, at 159.
Oeltjen and Fischer, however, appear to take a different focus noting only that "[A] good case can be
made for absolute preference for individual domestic uses." Oeltjen & Fischer, supra note 4, at 264.
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withdrawals from water sources, particularly for sewage disposal, very
little of that withdrawn water is consumed. To accomplish this top use
priority, he finds one essential element to be storing water both for
periods of shortfall and to meet increasing demand from the growth of
the community. As for storage above ground, Abrams finds sufficient
security for municipal supplies, 258 but the same does not exist, he says,
for underground storage. 259 Because many eastern states have statutes
providing for underground storage of gas, 260 such statutes may well
serve as a model for statutes providing for underground storage of water.
Abram's choice for second most important use is instream flow protec-
tion, which he identifies as even less of a consumptive use than municipal
needs. 26 1 However, the notion of consumptive use is a meaningful con-
cept only in the context that it prevents the water from being used or
reused, so to the extent that maintaining instream flows requires that
amount of water to flow to the ocean, 262 it is consumptive in the sense
that it cannot be used for any other use. But Abrams recognizes that
maintaining instream flow does not fit into a permit system approach
with the same facility as uses that have specific sponsors. "[H]ow protec-
tion can be coordinated with the preference system is the first order of
business in ensuring that instream flow protection does not compromise
the sewage and drinking water needs of concentrated populations."
263
The Regulated Riparian Model Water Code (Code)264 appears to
solve this problem by making minimum instream flow and lake level
protection in effect the top preference so that permits for withdrawal of
water from the source can be issued only as long as the minimum flow
or level is maintained, 265 but then subject to some exception in water
They conclude that alternative allocation systems would not protect such users; individuals generally
do not have the power of eminent domain, and under a market scheme, "a small farmer or non-farm
rural resident-may not have the financial means to purchase water rights from a senior owner."
Oeltjen & Fischer, supra note 4, at 264.
258. See Abrams, supra note 251, at 103.
259. See id. at 103. Western states are already dealing directly with underground storage of
water. See I WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, § 3.02 n.32 and accompanying text.
260. See, e.g., 220 ILL. COMP: STAT. ANN. 15/1 (West 2000).
261. Dean Trelease, writing in 1955, put as second: "uses for irrigation and industrial consump-
tion, where there is no substitute for water." Trelease, supra note 1, at 159. He noted that in some
areas tourism and hunting had become important commercial enterprises implicating protecting recrea-
tional, fish and wildlife values. Trelease, supra note 1, at 159. Although he referred to the recent
recognition of the need to maintain stream flow, he put that only in the context of being "adequate to
dilute municipal and industrial wastes and prevent downstream health problems." Trelease, supra note
1, at 159.
262. See Trelease, supra note 1, text accompanying note 143.
263. Abrams, supra note 251, at 102.
264. WATER LAWS COMMITTEE, AMERIcAN SOCIETY OF CIVIL ENGINEERS, THE REGULATED RIPARIAN
MODEL WATER C ODE (1997) [hereinafter RRMWC]. This Model Code contains commentary on each
provision as well as cross-references to related provisions in the Code and citation to comparable
provisions in existing statutes.
265. Id. § 6R-3-04(2) provides that allocations can be made "up to the safe yield or other
applicable limit." As to other applicable limits, see infra text accompanying notes 272-73. Safe yield
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emergencies. 266 The Code provides that the state agency is to establish
the minimum flow or level of any source and that established level will
not be subject to allocation except as provided in that part of the
Code.267 In setting the minimum flow or level, the agency is to set the
flow or level at the amount required for maintaining the biological,
chemical, and physical integrity of the source "taking into account nor-
mal seasonal variations in flow and need." 268 Persons exercising water
rights under the Code are required to protect the minimum flows or
levels. 269 The authors of the Code envision this protection being accom-
plished through provisions and conditions contained in any permit that
is granted under the Code. 270 However, whenever there are threats to the
minimum flows or levels, the agency can declare either a water shortage
or a water emergency. 27 1 During a water emergency, the agency has
authority to allocate water from the minimum flows or levels "when
necessary to prevent serious injuries to water uses established before the
beginning of the water emergency" but then only to the extent that the
allocation will not cause permanent impairment of any of the integri-
ties.272 The Code anticipates preplanning for emergencies by requiring
the agency to set emergency minimum flows or levels that cannot be in-
vaded "except to prevent grave threats to human life or health . . . where
water is not available from other sources for coping with these
needs." 273 Thus Abram's preference for human use comes to the fore
in the Code but only in the limiting context of this emergency provision.
The next issue for Abrams is the creation of additional priorities, the
issue of adding uses after the first round of uses have been determined,
the issue to what extent permits should be transferable and then transfer-
able to other priority level uses, and the issue of priority within each use
level. Abrams also explores the question of ascertaining the quantity of
water for which a preference permit would be issued. 274 He notes the
is defined as "the amount of water available for withdrawal without impairing the long-term social
utility of the water source, including the maintenance of the protected biological, chemical, and
physical integrity of the source." Id. § 2R-2-21. Biological, chemical, and physical integrity are in
turn defined. See id. §§ 2R-2-02, 2R-2-03, 2R-2-16. This is like the Arkansas approach discussed
supra text accompanying notes 145-49.
266. See infra text accompanying notes 272-73.
267. See RRMWC, supra note 264, § 3R-2-01(I).
268. RRMWC, supra note 264, § 3R-2-02. See supra note 265 for citations to the definitions of
the integrities.
269. See RRMWC, supra note 264, § 3R-2-01(2).
270. See RRMWC, supra note 264, at 82-3.
271. See RRMWC, supra note 264, § 3R-2-03(l); see also RRMWC, supra note 264, § 2R-2-31
(defining water shortage); RRMWC , supra note 264, § 2R-2-29 (defining water emergency).
272. RRMWC, supra note 264, § 3R-2-03(2).
273. RRMWC, supra note 264, § 3R-2-03(3).
274. This is important for the Model Code too, to make sure minimum flows and levels are not
ignored. This is easier to accomplish if permitted use quantities do not exceed normal flows, but this is
hard to do and with the possible exception of Texas, never done under prior appropriation. Abrams
also suggests the codification of the common law doctrines which would include a recognition of
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experience in quantifying under the prior appropriation system and the
federal reserved rights system and that the same scarcity and competition
issues that are behind those systems are important to those eastern states
that are moving away from common law riparianism.
The Code establishes an overall goal of allocating water among
users "in a sustainable manner." 275 As a part of carrying out that goal,
it establishes preferences for withdrawals up to a safe yield. 276 Safe yield
is defined as the minimum level necessary to maintain the "long-term
social utility of the water source, including . . . [maintaining protected
biological, chemical, and physical integrity of the source]." 277 The
Code establishes three basic categories of preference: (1) "direct human
consumption or sanitation necessary for human survival and health;" 278
(2) "uses necessary for the survival or health of livestock and to preserve
crops or physical plant and equipment from physical damage or loss
." depending on the water source;279 and (3) other uses to maximize
employment and economic benefits 280 "within the overall goal of sus-
tainable development as set forth in the comprehensive water plan."281
In noting that many statutes are more definitive in particularizing pre-
ferred uses such as for agriculture or industry, the authors and editors of
the Code observe that those choices "generally reflect political clout
rather than rational water management and are often not enforced in
practice anyway." 282 The Code does provide that within a use prefer-
ence category, uses that maximize the reasonable use of water are to be
preferred. 283 This according to the commentary should be worked out
in the state's comprehensive plan.284
superior ownership rights to imported water in the importer. See Abrams, supra note 251, at 104-05.
275. See RRMWC, supra note 264, § IR-1-02. The Code defines sustainable development as
"the integrated management of resources taking seriously the needs of future generations as well as
the current generation, assuring equitable access to resources, optimizing the use of non-renewable
resources, and averting the exhaustion of renewable resources." RRMWC, supra note 264,
§ 2R-2-24.
276. See RRMWC, supra note 264, § 6R-3-04(l); see also supra note 265.
277. See RRMWC, supra note 264, § 2R-2-21(l).
278. See RRMWC, supra note 264, § 6R-3-04(l). The Code in effect simply turns around
Abram's number 1 and 2 propositions. These, when viewed from a single family riparian owner per-
spective, were within the historic domestic or natural use category but here come with the expansion
to all riparian and nonriparians alike.
279. See RRMWC, supra note 264, § 6R-3-04(l). Some of these, to the extent represented by
use on riparian lands, were within the historic domestic or natural use preference, but are
considerably expanded to include larger livestock enterprises and to covering physical plants and
equipment.
280. See RRMWC, supra note 264, § 6R-3-04(1). Here is a historic purported purpose of the
adoption of prior appropriation doctrine in the west in the first place.
281. RRMWC, supra note 264, § 6R-3-04(1).
282. RRMWC, supra note 264, at 247.
283. See RRMWC, supra note 264, § 6R-3-04(3).
284. See id. at 248. The Code section on comprehensive planning provides that "the State will
develop a comprehensive water allocation plan and devise appropriate conservation and drought
management strategies to serve the public interest in the waters of the State through establishing and
maintaining sustainable development of the waters of the State." See RRMWC, supra note 264,
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With the overwhelming movement 285 toward environmental and eco-
system protection at the state level, 286 particularly through the establish-
ment of minimum stream flows and lake levels, 287 and with the historic
position for domestic use of number one in preferred use lists, it would
seem that the Code contains the best approach for the future. It provides
a workable scheme for interrelating the two. Even though the approach
appears in a Regulated Riparian code there is no significant reason why
it would not be adaptable to prior appropriation doctrine states. 288
Furthermore, and certainly to the extent of the interconnection between
surface water and groundwater, these principles would also govern
groundwater. The public trust doctrine and the federal statutes enacted
in the 1960s support the notion of preferring ecosystem protection. The
universal provision for the availability of eminent domain to acquire
municipal water supplies supports the preferred status of domestic use.
With the preferences for ecosystem protection and domestic use, it is
doubtful that further preferences are necessary except in the context of
drought or other water emergencies. There use preferences should con-
tinue to be specified and probably in considerable detail so that the
public will understand ahead of time what will happen with water use
during a drought.
§ I R- 1-04. See supra note 275 for the Code definition of sustainable development.
285. "Movement" is a fair description, as the process of establishing a top priority for ecosystem
maintenance and protection is not accomplished. Consider for example the status of instream flows
under Nebraska law. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-2,107 to -2,119 (1998) (instream appropriations).
286. See generally Lynda L. Butler, Environmental Water Rights: An Evolving Concept of Public
Property, 9 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 323 (1990).
287. See generally 2 WATERS AND WATER RiGHTS, supra note 3, §§ 13.05(a), 15.03(c)(4)(C); I
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 2, §§ 7.05, 9.05(b).
288. For approaches to minimum stream flow and lake level protection in the western United
States, see INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST (L. MacDonnell & T. Rice eds., 2d ed. 1993).
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